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Can we have thought without language?
”It is sometimes maintained that there can be no
thought without language, but to this view I cannot
assent: I hold that there can be thought, and even true
and false belief, without language. But however that
may be, it cannot be denied that all fairly elaborate
thoughts require words.
I can know, in a sense, that I have five fingers,
without knowing the word five, but I cannot know that
the population of London is about eight millions unless
I have acquired the language of arithmetic, nor can I
have any thought at all closely corresponding to what
is asserted in the sentence: the ratio of the
circumference of a circle to the diameter is
approximately 3.14159.
Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope
and Limits

Let me start with a quote from Andy Clark’s book Being
There.
Take for example the humble cockroach. The
roach is heir to a considerable body of cockroach
style common sense knowledge. At least that is
how it must appear to any theorist who thinks
explicit knowledge is the key to sensible looking
real world behavior!

The roach senses the wind disturbance caused
by the motion of an attacking predator.
It distinguishes wind caused by predators from
normal breezes and air currents.
it does not avoid contact with other roaches.
When it does initiate an escape motion it does
not simply run at random, instead it takes into
account
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its own initial orientation.
the presence of obstacles such as walls and
corners.
the degree of illumination.
and the direction of the wind.

Andy Clark in Being There

So the roach acts as if it is doing some thinking but surely
not thinking as we understand it. We humans have a
“knowledge base” which is typically expressed in language
(although Ryle would disagree) but most creatures do not
use language very much or at all. And I doubt that Yuja
Wang when she plays Rachmaninoff is doing much thinking.

So we need to separate rationality from an intimate
connection with language and find ways to measure it
directly based on what it does.. We also need to be aware
that for a creature or a person only that much rationality is
required in its actions as is necessary for it to live its life
successfully. Lionesses are pretty good at cooperating when
hunting, but when they have had a full meal, they do not
watch TV or look at their cell phone. They sleep.

Thus rationality will depend on the way they see the world,
which is likely different from ours, and the abilities which
they have and that rationality will be aimed at its actual
needs. Rationality then should be defined as making the
best use of its abilities and its perceptions.
We can also define a sort of IQ as the ratio of utility
obtained from what a creature actually does divided by the
utility obtained from what it could ideally do. This ratio will
never be more than 1 but its advantage is that unlike our
usual IQ, it does not depend on its chronological age .
Historically, IQ was a score obtained by dividing a person’s mental age
score, obtained by administering an intelligence test, by the person’s
chronological age, both expressed in terms of years and months. The
resulting fraction (quotient) was multiplied by 100 to obtain the IQ
score.

Definition An algorithmic rationality model (ARM) consists of
1. A probability space (W , p) where W is a space of points
and p is a probability function on W satisfying the
Kolomogorov axioms. Often W may be finite.
2. A utility function u from W into R
3. A finite set A of functions a1 , ..., an from W to W .
The ai are thought to be actions which take the agent from
point w to the point ai (w ).
4. A finite set P = {p1 , .., pm } of perceptions which are maps
from W to {0,1}. (The truth value of pi at w )
5. A map value from P × W → {0, 1}
Explanation: Given w ∈ W , u(w ) is the utility to the agent
(thus far unique) of being at state w .

Programs
1. Each ai is a program.
2. If α, β are programs, so is α; β
3. If α, β are programs and p is a perception then if p then do
α else β is a program
4. if α is a program and p is a perception then while p do α is
a program

Definition
Functions defined by programs.
I

if ai is a basic action then f (ai ) = ai (since ai was given as
a function)

I

f (α; β) = f (α) o f (β)

I

f (if p then α else β) = {(w , w 0 ) : p(w ) = 1 & w 0 =
f (α)(w ) or p(w ) = 0 & w 0 = f (β)(w )}

I

f (while p do α)(w ) = w 0 iff there is a chain
w = w1 , ..., wn = w 0 such that p(wi ) = 1 for i < n,
f (α)(wi ) = wi+1 for i < n and p(w 0 ) = 0.

Intuitively each program α creates a function f (α) from W
to W . Composing with u yields a function vα from W to
R + . Let us call this function the crude value of α. Thus
vα (w ) = u(f (w ). Crude because the value depends on the
w where you are now.

We now need to define the net value of α .
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The safety value of α is minw ∈W vα (w ).
The average value of α is the expected value over W of
vα .
The best value of α is maxw ∈W vα (w )

Ordering of ARM models
Given two ARM models M1 and M2 we will say that M2 refines
M1 if M2 has more actions and more perceptions (or finer
perceptions).
Proposition If M2 refines M1 then all three of c-value, a-value
and b-value are higher with M2 .
Proof: The proof follows from the following easy observation.
Observation: Let Ω be some space of objects and let v be a
function from Ω to R. Given a subset M ⊆ Ω define
V (M) = max{v (x)|x ∈ M} Then if M1 ⊆ M2 then
V (M1 ) ≤ V (M2 )
A creature which has more actions or more perceptions will have
better values whether safety, average or maximum.

The program a1 if p else a2 has expected value 4.25
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The program a1 if p ≡ q else a2 has expected value 6. Knowing both
p and q is better.
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Sen’s Capability Approach

Sen argues that our evaluations and policies should
focus on what people are able to do and be, on the
quality of their life, and on removing obstacles in their
lives so that they have more freedom to live the kind of
life that, upon reflection, they have reason to value.
The capability approach has been advanced in
somewhat different directions by Martha Nussbaum,
who has used the capability approach as the
foundation for a partial theory of justice.

According to the capability approach, the ends of
well-being, justice and development should be
conceptualized in terms of people’s capabilities to
function; that is, their effective opportunities to
undertake the actions and activities that they want to
engage in, and be whom they want to be. These
beings and doings, which Sen calls functionings,
together constitute what makes a life valuable.
What is ultimately important is that people have
the freedoms or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to
lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what
they want to do and be the person they want to be.
Once they effectively have these substantive
opportunities, they can choose those options that they
value most.
Robeyns 2005

It is clear that a society can increase the capabilities of its
members in some way. For instance a bus line makes more
places accessible to people who do not have cars.
Wheelchairs incease the mobility of people who are
handicapped. Reserving some parking spaces for
handicapped people can have a similar effect.
Thus it is society which brings about an increase from a
particular M1 to a finer M2

Then why don’t all creatures have maximal actions and
perceptions?
Because such perceptions may have a cost. For instance a
fly gets caught in a spider web because the thread in the
web is too fine for the fly’s vision. But since flies are far
more numerous than spiders, it does not make sense for all
flies to have finer vision so that a few flies survive.

A Problem
A society can create more capabilities for its members by
various means. A swimming pool allows people to swim. A
bridge allows them to cross a river. So each person’s ARM
M1 increases to a bigger ARM M2 and his utility can
increase. all to the good we say.
But it is not so simple. If you have a gun it increases your
utility but decreases mine. If you have a smart phone,
perhaps you will not bother to talk to me.
I don’t know if Sen or Nussbaum have thought about the
capability approach in just this way.

We can now say that a creature is c-rational if it chooses a
procedure which maximizes the safety value. (c stands for
cautious).
We can say that a creature is a-rational if it chooses a
procedure which maximizes the average value (a stands for
average).
We can say that a creature is b-rational if it chooses a
procedure which maximizes the best value.

In order to survive and prosper an animal needs to take some
risks. Taking such risks will decrease the c value but increase
the b-value. Consider a man who climbs a mountain because
he hopes that a beautiful girl will love him and let us
suppose also that this belief is justified. He could choose not
to climb the mountain and marry a less beautiful girl. Or he
may choose to climb the mountain and increase the best
value but sharply decrease the safety value. This issue has
been discussed in a paper by Tasdemir, Witzel and myself.

Generally there would be a conflict between maximizing
safety and maximizing the best outcome But we can still
define a notion of pareto-rationality. A creature is pareto
rational if it uses a program α such that no other β
exceedes α in all three of c-value, a-value and b-value. Thus
consider the young man Ajay who climbs a mountain in
hopes of marrying a beautiful girl and another one Surya
who avoids the mountain and marries a less pretty girl.
They are both Pareto rational.

Cockroaches come out at night but not during the day. We
can now see that this behavior is rational. It increases the
c-value since they are not visible during the night. They are
also b-rational since they get to eat the crumbs which
foolish humans have left behind. Overly cautious roaches
may starve to death. (I won’t say anything about whether
humans leaving these crumbs are rational!).

The Tick

Figure: A tick - an unappreciated genius

Unfed adult American dog ticks can go 2-3 years (up to 1,053
days) without food!

Figure:

Siddhartha: I can fast and I can wait!

Once the female (tick) has copulated, she cfimbs
with her full count of eight legs to the tip of a
protruding branch of any shrub in order either to fall
onto small mammals who run by underneath or to let
herself be brushed off the branch by large ones.

The eyeless creature finds the way to its lookout
with the help of a general sensitivity to light in the
skin. The blind and deaf bandit becomes aware of the
approach of its prey through the sense of smell. The
odor of butyric acid, which is given off by the skin
glands of all mammals, gives the tick the signal to
leave its watch post and leap off. If it then falls onto
something warm – which its fine sense of temperature
will tell it – then it has reached its prey, the
warm-blooded animal, and needs only use its sense of
touch to find a spot as free of hair as possible in order
to bore past its own head into the skin tissue of the
prey. Now, the tick pumps a stream of warm blood
slowly into itself.

Experiments with artificial membranes and liquids
other than blood have demonstrated that the tick has
no sense of taste, for, after boring through the
membrane, it takes in any liquid, so long as it has the
right temperature.
If, after sensing the butyric acid smell, the tick falls
onto something cold, then it has missed its prey and
must climb back up to its lookout post.
The tick’s hearty blood meal is also its last meal,
for it now has nothing more to do than fall to the
ground, lay its eggs, and die.
von Uexküll, Jakob. ”A foray into the worlds of
animals and humans” (2010).

We will describe the activities of the tick using the following
baby program.
Perceptions: Bu (for Butyric acid), Wa (for warm), Ba (for bare)
F (for full)
Actions: c (for climb), w (for wait), d (for drop), se (for search),
su (for suck), l (for lay eggs),
Informal program: Climb on a grass stalk and wait until Butyric
acid is detected, Then drop on to the mammal, and search for a
bare spot. Suck blood until full. Then drop and lay eggs.
More formal version: Begin: c;(w until B);d; if Wa then (se
until Ba & Wa) else c;(su until F);d; l End.
It is a rather bare bones program but allows the species to
prosper.

Evolution and programs
We saw that the benefit to a tick comes not from a single action
but from a program. But can programs evolve? Koza 2010 says
yes.
The goal of getting computers to automatically
solve problems is central to artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and the broad area of research
encompassed by what Alan Turing called machine
intelligence [1, 2]. As early as 1948, Turing recognized
the possibility of employing the processes of natural
selection and evolution to achieve machine intelligence.
In his essay Intelligent Machines, Turing [1] identified
three approaches for creating intelligent computer
programs.

The first approach was a logic-driven search. Turing’s
interest in this approach is not surprising in light of Turings
own pioneering work in the 1930s on the logical foundations
of computing.
The second approach for achieving machine intelligence
was what Turing called a cultural search in which previously
acquired knowledge is accumulated, stored in libraries, and
brought to bear in solving a problemthe approach taken by
subsequent work in the field of knowledge-based expert
systems.
The third approach that Turing identified in 1948 for
achieving machine intelligence is: the genetical or
evolutionary search by which a combination of genes is
looked for, the criterion being the survival value.

Thanks to Sheila Miller and Brian Skyrms for
comments

References
I

Dennett, Daniel Clement. The intentional stance. MIT
press, 1989.

I

Koza, John R. ”Human-competitive results produced by
genetic programming.” Genetic programming and evolvable
machines 11.3 (2010): 251-284.

I

Lurz, Robert W. The philosophy of animal minds.
Cambridge University Press, 2009.

I

Nagel, Thomas. ”What is it like to be a bat?.” The
philosophical review, 83.4 (1974): 435-450.

I

Nussbaum, Martha C. ”Creating capabilities: The human
development approach and its implementation.” Hypatia
24.3 (2009): 211-215.

I

Parikh, Rohit, Cagil Tademir, and Andreas Witzel. ”The
power of knowledge in games. International Game Theory
Review, 15.04 (2013): 1340030

I

Rohit Parikh, Formalizing the Umwelt, talk given at the
Universal logic meeting, Vichy, 2018.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/preview.cgi?article=1851&co

I

Pratt, Vaughan R. ”Semantical considerations on
Floyd-Hoare logic.” 17th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1976). IEEE, 1976.

I

Robeyns, I.,, 2005, The Capability Approach: A theoretical
survey, Journal of Human Development, 6(1): 93117.

I

Sen, Amartya. ”Well-being, agency and freedom: The
Dewey lectures 1984.” The journal of philosophy 82.4
(1985): 169-221.

I
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